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"offset" the greenhouse gas (GHG) pollution generated through
their activities by investing in a carbon offset. For example, when
booking a flight online with Delta Airlines, Expedia.com, or
Travelocity, you have the opportunity to pay an extra twenty-fifty
dollars to a third party partner, who will then invest your money
into an offset project that will help "erase" the pollution or
"carbon footprint" you create by flying to your destination. Your
money might fund a wind farm somewhere in the Midwest,
methane capture at a landfill in Texas, or reforestation efforts in
California.' The new stand of trees that your investment funds
will purportedly soak up an amount of GHG pollution in the
atmosphere roughly equivalent to the amount of GHG pollution
you create by flying, say, from New York City to San Francisco.
Instead of contributing to global warming, your cross-country
flight is now rendered "carbon neutral." There currently exist
carbon neutral football games, baby showers, computer
companies-even legislators-all of whom have ostensibly
achieved "carbon neutrality" by purchasing offsets as well as
(perhaps) by reducing their GHG emissions. 2  This market is
expanding, with an estimated sixty-five million tons sold in the
United States in 2007, valued at approximately $337.3 million.3
That number represents a threefold increase in value from 2006.4
In the absence of mandatory federal limits on GHG emissions
in the United States, the voluntary market for "offsetting"
I Examples of such projects include the Elk River Wind Project in Butler County
Kansas; the Waste Management Inc., landfill to methane sites in Austin, TX and San
Antonio, TX; and the Pacific Forest Trust Butano Falls Project in San Francisco, CA.
2 See, e.g., Balance Your Equation, http://www.balanceyourequation.com/what-
are-offsets.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) (with a function allowing you to calculate
your carbon footprint); see also TerraPass Carbon Balanced Business program,
http://www.terrapass.com/business (allowing companies to reduce the carbon footprints
of their businesses).
3 For a summary of the voluntary markets, see ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE & NEW
CARBON FINANCE, FORGING A FRONTIER: STATE OF THE VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS
2008 21 (2008) [hereinafter FORGING A FRONTIER], available at
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/documents/cmsdocuments/2008_StateofVolunt
aryCarbonMarket2.pdf. For a summary of both regulated and voluntary carbon markets,
see WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF TE CARBON MARKET 2008 (2008), available
at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/State&TrendsformattedO6May 10
pm.pdf.
4 See FORGING A FRONTIER, supra note 3.
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pollution emissions provides consumers with opportunities to
address climate change by ameliorating some of their pollution
generating activities. Consumers of offsets include individuals
and organizations - including businesses, nonprofits,
governments, universities, religious congregations, and others -
voluntarily seeking to green up their act. In the case of
individuals, like the traveler paying extra money to offset her
airline flight from New York to San Francisco, those participating
in the voluntary market are seemingly driven by a sense of
environmental responsibility and altruism. In the case of
organizations and corporate consumers, participation may be
motivated by a sense of corporate social responsibility, 5 a
perceived market advantage in claiming voluntary carbon
neutrality,6 or the potential advantage of pre-compliance (i.e.
banking that future legislation will recognize current GHG
reduction).7
5 See Just Good Business, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.economist.com/specialreports/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=10491077
("The great green awakening is making company after company take a serious look at its
own impacts on the environment."). See also Judd F. Sneirson, Green is Good:
Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA
L. REv. 3 (forthcoming in 2009) (debunking the view of corporate governance as
responsive only to shareholder profits and presenting a new paradigm for sustainable
corporate governance).
6 In fact, many companies strategically engage in Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) to create competitive advantages for themselves. See Michael E. Porter & Mark
R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: the Link Between Competitive Advantage and
Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. Bus. REv. 78 (2006), available at
http://harvardbusinessonline.hbsp.harvard.edu/email./pdfs/PorterDec 2006.pdf, see
also John M. Conley & Cynthia Williams, The Corporate Social Responsibility
Movement as an Ethnographic Problem, SSRN Abstract 1285631 (Aug. 2008) (CSR
appears to function more as language than substantive action, and may serve merely to
co-opt critics, preempt regulation, and mislead consumers), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per id=55244#reg. But see Graeme
Auld, Steven Bernstein, & Benjamin Cashore, The New Corporate Social Responsibility,
ANN. REV. OF ENV'T & RES., Vol. 33 (Nov. 2008) (exploring the differences between
efforts promoting learning and stakeholder engagement from efforts requiring direct
behavior changes).
7 See, e.g., Lieberman-Wamer Climate Security Act of 2008, S.3036, 110th Cong.
§§ 2402 & 2502 (2008) (anticipated the use of carbon offsets in meeting emission
reduction goals). For a critical look at the limitations of the current movement towards
"corporate greening" and CSR, see James Gustave Speth, The Bridge at the Edge of the
World, in CAPITALISM, THE ENVIRONMENT, & CROSSING FROM CRISIS TO SUSTANABILITY
174-78 (2008) ("The big gorilla in the room - the main force driving corporate greening
2009
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The carbon offset market has provoked strong criticism.
Offsets have been labeled by some as papal indulgences that
satisfy our guilty conscience while we continue to satiate our thirst
for fossil fuel and energy use. 8 The main point of such criticism is
that offsets alone will never succeed in mitigating climate change.
And the norms we encourage through public policy are a crucial
part of succeeding in mitigating climate change. Individuals in the
United States account for approximately one-third of all GHG
emissions in the United States - that is more than any one industry
source, and accounts for about eight percent of the earth's total
GHG emissions. 9 That eight percent is greater than emissions
from all of Africa, Central America and South America combined,
and larger than the emissions of every foreign nation, save
China. 10 In other words, the U.S. carbon footprint is simply too
big to offset. Policies must favor reducing emissions, rather than
focusing primarily on offsetting, which may siphon off dollars and
political will from the difficult task of reducing GHG emissions."l
Moreover, while entities and individuals reap the public
relations benefit of claiming "carbon neutrality," it is far from
clear what the term means. For example, Dell Computer
Company (Dell) recently announced that it had achieved "carbon
neutrality" by offsetting its corporate "carbon footprint" through a
combination of energy efficiency measures and the purchase of
in the past and in the future- is government action, actual and anticipated, domestic and
foreign.").
8 Laurie Al Ristinto, It's Not Easy Being Green: Reflections on the American
Carbon Offset Market, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. & POL'Y 34, (Winter 2008); Andrew C.
Revkin, Carbon-Neutral is Hip, but is it Green? N.Y. TIMEs, April 29, 2007, at 41. See
also Kevin Smith, The Carbon Neutral Myth: Offset Indulgences for Your Climate Sins,
Carbon Trade Watch (2007), http://www.carbontradewatch.org/pubs/carbonneutral_
myth.pdf.
9 Michael P. Vandenberg & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon Neutral
Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1694 (2007) (describing the striking impact
of individual U.S. citizen's behavior on GHG emissions and advocating the
need for government to address those emissions by "drawling] on norms theory
and empirical studies to demonstrate how legal reforms can tie the widely held
abstract norm of personal responsibility to the emerging concrete norm of
carbon neutrality").
10 Id.
II Id. at 1703.
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carbon offsets. 12  However, there exists no uniform definition of
carbon footprint against which to measure Dell's claim. In fact, in
determining its carbon footprint, Dell did not include the oil used
by its suppliers, the fuel used to ship its products to consumers, or
the electricity needed to operate its products. 13  Yet consumers
looking to buy a computer might mistakenly conclude that Dell's
announced carbon neutrality means that buying a Dell computer
will not contribute to climate change.
The focus of this paper is the reliability of the carbon offsets
used by Dell and other entities in achieving carbon neutrality and
reducing GHG emissions. Specifically, Dell claims that the
offsets it purchased "meet the highest standards" that currently
exist. 14  In fact, there currently exist at least ten carbon offset
protocols and certification programs from which to choose, each
with its own set of certification standards.' 5 The lack of a single,
12 Jeffrey Ball, Green Goal of 'Carbon Neutrality' Hits Limit, WALL ST. J., Dec.
30, 2008, at Al.
13 See id
14 See id. (quoting Dane Parker, Dell Director of Environmental Health and
Safety). Even Dell's purported use of the "highest standards" leaves room for doubt as
to the claimed efficacy of its offset projects. Dell carbon offset investments range from
tree planting through its "Plant a Tree for Me" program, to protection of a threatened
forest in Madagascar, to heavy investment in renewable energy through support of wind
turbines across the Mid-West. Renewable energy credits (RECs) have been criticized in
particular because of claims that the projects would have been funded even without the
offset credit investment. For example, the sponsors of one of Dell's offset projects, the
Mid-American wind projects in Iowa, have noted that the project is receiving a federal
tax credit and would "absolutely" have been built even without Dell's support. The
particular offset attribute at issue in the Mid American project is expressed as
"additionality," which means that the offset must decrease GHG emissions below
quantities that would have been emitted in a business as usual situation. Because of the
particular problems associated with determining additionality in the context of renewable
energy, many have argued that RECs should not qualify as carbon offsets. Similar
concerns confront forestry offsets such as tree planting projects which present
permanence issues regarding the survival of the trees. But see Timothy R. Dodge,
Bringing Forests Back into the Fold: Increasing the Role of Forest Offsets in
International Efforts to Address Climate Change (Dec. 5, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (citing the large role of forests in the global carbon cycle
and the relative cost-effective nature of forest offsets in relation to other offset options,
and proposing the expanded use of forest offsets through improved monitoring,
verification, and other risk-reduction measures).
15 See U.S. GOv'T ACCTBLTY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONG. REQUESTERS, CARBON
OFFSETS, THE U.S. MARKET IS GROWING, BUT QUALITY ASSURANCE POSES CHALLENGES
FOR MARKET PARTICIPANTS GAO-08-1048, 56-57, app. VII (2008) [hereinafter GAO
2009
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standardized certification program for carbon offsets creates
consumer confusion and the potential for fraud in the market.' 6 A
recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, released
in late September 2008, questions the lack of federal oversight in
the U.S. carbon offset market, noting: "The proliferation of
standards has caused confusion in the market, and the existence of
multiple quality assurance mechanisms with different
requirements raises questions about the quality of offsets available
on the voluntary market, according to many stakeholders."'
' 7
Moreover, there are conflicting reports on how widespread offset
certification is in the retail market, with estimates ranging from
eighty-five percent to less than fifty percent. 8 Thus, some number
of consumers purchase offsets that have received no certification
verifying the reliability of promised GHG reductions.1 9
The potential for consumer fraud-or at the least, consumer
confusion-undermines the promise of the carbon offset market to
help mitigate climate change. Yet offsets can comprise an
REPORT]; see also FORGING A FRONTIER, supra note 3, at 54. There exist a range of
quality assurance mechanisms, which are applied at different stages of the carbon offset
supply chain, but few if any that cover the entire supply chain. GAO REPORT at 24, 27.
16 See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, THE ROLE OF OFFSETS IN A GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM: POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND CONCERNS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT TO CONG. 1 (2008), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/103675.pdf, at 4. "Due to the lack of
common standards, some observers have referred to the [voluntary] market as the 'wild
west.' This should not suggest that all offsets are low quality, but that the consumer
must adopt a buyer-beware mentality when purchasing offsets." See ANJA KOLLMUS,
HELGE ZINK, & CLIFFORD POLYCARP, MAKING SENSE OF THE VOLUNTARY CARBON
MARKET, A COMPARISON OF CARBON OFFSET STANDARDS, STOCKHOLM ENV'T INST. &
TRICORONA, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND GERMANY (March 2008) [hereinafter WWF REPORT
2008], available at http://assets.panda.org/downloads/vcm_report fmal.pdf, at 34 ("The
lack of third-party project verification by a certified and independent auditor is one of the
biggest gaps in the current voluntary carbon offset market.").
17 GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 27.
18 Id. at 24-25.
19 Id. An investigation in 2007 by the Financial Times found "[a] shortage of
verification, making it difficult for buyers to assess the true value of carbon credits."
Fiona Harvey & Stephen Fidler, Industry Caught in Carbon 'Smokescreen, FINANCIAL
TIMES, April 25, 2007, at 1.
20 See STATE OF VERMONT OFFICE OF Ar-Y. GEN., RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST FOR
PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE FTC's REGULATORY REvIEw OF THE GUIDES FOR THE USE OF
ENv'n MARKETING CLAIMS, cmt. 73 (Jan. 28, 2008) (on behalf of the Attorneys General
of Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Mississippi, New
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important part of GHG reduction strategies. Offset projects create
opportunities for innovative responses to GHG emissions by
encouraging investment in sectors not required to reduce
emissions.2  Offsets provide investments for projects that
otherwise might not get funding (aforestation, reforestation,
agricultural "no till" methods) and incentivize pollution sectors
that would not otherwise be covered under mandatory reductions
22(methane bums at landfills). In this way the offset markets
operate as a kind of laboratory for testing new methodologies and
emission reduction technologies. Given the tremendous potential
of the offset market to serve as a catalyst for innovative change
and to spur GHG reductions, it is worth examining methods for
addressing these consumer protection and market integrity
concerns.
This article makes a case for introducing some measure of
government oversight into the market and standardizing the
certification of carbon offsets. Blending government regulation
and the role of private entities in forming and enforcing that
certification standard creates the "Newest Hybrid" to which the
title of this paper refers. Part I places carbon offsets in the context
of current GHG strategies by describing the market and its
challenges. Part II looks for insights regarding the regulation of
the carbon offset market by investigating the evolution of the
organic products market, which progressed from a fragmented,
Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Vermont to the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC)), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/carbonworkshop/533254-
00051 .pdf [hereinafter VERMONT OFFICE OF ATTY. GEN.] (lack of common standards and
definitions, along with the intangible nature of carbon offsets, makes it difficult for
consumers to verify that they are receiving what they paid for and creates a significant
potential for deceptive claims); The Financial Times investigation found "[w]idespread
instances of people and organizations buying worthless credits that do not yield
reductions in carbon emissions." See Harvey & Fidler, supra note 19, and
accompanying text.
21 Cap-and-trade programs are often limited to large facilities or a single industrial
sector of industry. See, e.g., REG. GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE MODEL RULE Xx- 1.4(a)
(Jan. 5, 2007), available at http://rggi.org/docs/model_rulecorrected1_5-07.pdf
[hereinafter RGGI MODEL RULE] (applies only to electricity generating facilities with a
nameplate capacity equal to or greater than 25 MW). See also Acid Rain Program
General Provisions, 40 C.F.R. § 72.6 (2000) (affected units limited to combustion units
that meet certain capacity and operation requirements).
22 See RAMSEUR, supra note 16, at 3.
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multi-standard approach to a uniform system of certification. Part
III examines the potential role of market participants in creating
and administering a uniform certification standard. Part IV
concludes by discussing the need for meaningful government
oversight to ensure accountability in standard setting and
implementation of uniform certification in the offset market.
I. Carbon Offsets: An Important Piece of the Climate
Change Puzzle
In the face of warming temperatures, melting ice caps, rising
seas, and extreme weather patterns, climate change has emerged as
one of the most urgent problems facing the Obama administration.
Policy makers must simultaneously create adaptation mechanisms
to deal with the effects of climate change - coastal land loss,
migration, disaster relief, increased pressure on our ailing health
care infrastructure, habitat and species protection, to name a few -
while also implementing measures to drastically cut green house
gas emissions to slow the rate of global warming. This paper
focuses on the latter challenge - cutting GHG emissions.
Specifically, this paper examines the role carbon offsets can play
in addressing climate change.
We approach pollution control in the United States through
traditional command and control regulation23 and a range of
incentive programs such as the "cap-and-trade" sulfur dioxide
(acid rain) market incentive program implemented under the Clean
23 Generally, the government promulgates "command" regulation limiting pollution
emission and "controls" those limitations by penalizing exceedences. See, e.g., Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2006). The Clean Air Act was originally enacted in
1963 and amended on numerous occasions, most recently in 1990. See Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 6921-7671 (1994)). The 1970 Amendments established the primary
command and control regulatory structure, while the 1990 Amendments expanded the
scope of regulated emissions and processes, and also provided alternative regulatory and
market-based systems. Reducing GHG emissions through the use of a carbon tax is
another potential climate change strategy. See Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative
Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change Legislative Proposal is "Best"? 102 N.W.
U. L. REv. Colloquy 123, 136 (2007); see also John C. Dernbach, Harnessing Individual
Behavior to Address Climate Change: Options for Congress, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107,
111-14 (2008) (summary of major bills); see also Gilbert E. Metcalf & David A.
Weisbach, Design of a Carbon Tax, U. OF CHI. L. & ECON., Olin Working Paper No.
447; Public Law Working Paper No. 254; SSRN-id1324854pdf.
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Air Act (CAA). 24  A cap-and-trade program sets a "cap" or
"ceiling" on the amount of a particular pollutant or group of
pollutants that an industry may emit in a given time period. Those
entities subject to the cap (referred to as "covered" entities) are
allotted a certain number of pollution allowances which may be
used by the entity or "traded" (i.e. sold) to another covered entity
which has exceeded its allotted number of allowances. 25 Cap-and-
trade programs promote economic efficiency by allowing emitters
to determine whether to reduce pollution at their facility or
purchase the right to pollute above their limit by paying someone
else for their unused allowances.26 These programs work most
efficiently when there is a sufficiently stringent cap on overall
emissions that creates scarcity in the marketplace.
27
Both direct regulation and market-based approaches are
currently being tried in various forms across the country. For
example, the EPA is litigating whether, and to what extent, it must
regulate carbon emissions from autos under the CAA, which is a
first step towards federal command and control regulation of
GHGs.28  In the fall of 2008, the Regional Green House Gas
24 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2006).
25 Id.
26 A potential consequence of the cap-and-trade model of pollution reduction is the
development of "hot spots," concentrations of pollution in the communities (which are
typically low income communities) that surround major sources of pollution. Hot spots
are not presented as a significant danger in the GHG arena because of the nature of the
GHG pollutants regulated do not have a localized effect (although non-GHG pollutants
associated with these same sources may present a hot spot problem). See Flatt, supra
note 23, at 136. See also David M. Driesen, Trading and Its Limits, 14 PENN. ST. ENVTL.
L. REV. 169, 169 (2006).
27 See Leslie K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade:
Moving Toward Stringency, San Diego Legal Stud. Paper No. 08-076 (2008),
(forthcoming in the COLUM. J. OF ENvTL. L.).
28 See Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 528-29, 533 (2007) (holding that
carbon dioxide and other GHGs are pollutants under the Clean Air Act, and that EPA has
a non-discretionary duty to determine whether GHGs emitted from new motor vehicles
endanger public health or welfare and, if so, to either promulgate regulations, or,
alternatively, to supply a valid reason for not making such a determination). Following
this decision, EPA prepared an "endangerment finding," but despite repeated efforts by
Congress and members of the public to obtain the document, it has not been released.
Darren Samuelsohn, CLIMATE: Bush Admin Rejects Bid to Unseal EPA Endangerment
Finding, GREENwIRE, Jan. 5, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2009/01/05
/4. The document will likely be released during the Obama Administration, following
the change in EPA leadership. Id.
2009
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Initiative (RGGI) came on line, setting a regional cap on power
plant pollution that now regulates over 200 power plants from
Maryland to Maine, with a goal of ten percent carbon reductions
by 201 8.29 Other compliance markets are up and coming. 30
One key innovation of compliance markets is the ability to not
only trade pollution allowances, but also the ability to meet a
portion of pollution reduction through investment in carbon
offsets.3' Offsets are essentially GHG reduction projects
promoted by entities not covered by an emission reduction
29 See RGGI Memorandum of Understanding 1-3 (Dec. 20, 2005), available at
http://rggi.org/docs/mou_12_20 05.pdf (listing CT, DE, MA, ME, NH, NJ NY, RI, and
VT as participants and noting scheduled reductions); RGGI Second Amendment to
Memorandum of Understanding 1 (Apr. 20, 2007), available at
http://rggi.org/docs/mousecond-amend.pdf (adding Maryland as a signatory). See
generally RGGI Model Rule, supra note 21, for regulations respecting the
implementation of the agreement in each individual state. See, e.g., 7 DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 7, § 6043-6044 (2008), for an example of a state regulation implementing the
Memorandum of Understanding. Under RGGI, five project categories are eligible for
C0 2 offset allowances, including: (1) landfill methane capture and destruction; (2)
reduction in emissions of sulfur hexafluoride (SF6); (3) sequestration of carbon due to
afforestation; (4) reduction or avoidance of C0 2 emissions from natural gas, oil, or
propane end-use combustion due to end-use energy efficiency in the building sector; and
(5) avoided methane emissions from agricultural manure management operations. Id. §
XX-10.5(a)-(f). Under normal conditions, up to 3.3% of an electric generator's
emissions may be met with approved offsets, but this limit on the use of offsets may be
increased up to 10% if the RGGI C02 allowance price exceeds certain threshold values.
Id. § XX-6.5(a)(3). See also id. §§ XX-1.2(bc) and (bd) (defining the threshold C02
allowance prices for a stage-one or stage-two event that would allow the increased use of
offsets for compliance).
30 The Western Climate Initiative, which includes Arizona, California, New
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington, as well as the Canadian provinces of British
Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec, was formed in February, 2007, and could
reach a cap of approximately one billion tons by 2020, if implemented. The Midwestern
Greenhouse Gas Accord was signed in November, 2007, by Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Manitoba. The program is intended to start in
2012 and will incorporate a regional cap-and-trade system covering a majority of the
sectors of the economy. Internationally, the federal governments of Australia and
Canada recently released a federal economy-wide cap-and-trade scheme covering all six
Kyoto gases. OFFICE OF INNOVATION, THE BANK OF N.Y. MELLON, TOWARDS A COMMON
CARBON CURRENCY: EXPLORING THE PROSPECTS FOR INTEGRATED GLOBAL CARBON
MARKETS 12 (2008) [hereinafter MELLON REPORT], available at http://www.bnymellon.
com/news/commentaries/issuerservices/carbonmarkets.pdf
31 See RAMSEUR, supra note 16, at 1 ("If a cap-and-trade program includes offsets,
regulated entities have the opportunity to purchase them to help meet compliance
obligations.").
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program.32  Thus, in addition to actually reducing pollution or
purchasing allowances from other covered entities, cap-and-trade
participants can meet a portion of their obligation by paying
another entity to reduce its emissions when that entity otherwise
would not be required to do so.33  For example, under a carbon
emissions cap-and-trade scheme, a coal burning power plant
located in Tennessee might find that it makes greater economic
sense to fund a methane bum project at a landfill in Texas, rather
than investing in additional pollution control equipment at the
Tennessee power plant.34  Methane gas is an unregulated
byproduct of landfills, and, absent funding as an offset project,
there exists little incentive to dispose of the methane by burning it
as an energy source.35 Funding the offset project thus achieves a
reduction in the total GHG released into the atmosphere and
encourages investments in sectors not required to reduce GHG
emissions.
36
The voluntary carbon offset market in the United States has
grown up in the absence of any federal cap on GHG emissions and
without the benefit of a national compliance market.37 There are
two distinct aspects of this voluntary carbon offset market: the
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) and the over the counter retail
38
market. CCX is a voluntary pollution reduction and trading
32 Id.
33 Id. at 3.
34 See id. (noting that a regulated entity may consider purchasing offsets if the
offsets are less expensive than making direct, onsite emissions reductions). Of course,
reducing emissions from the Tennessee power plant would create additional
environmental and health benefits for people living and working near the power plant.
While GHG is not a localized problem, the collateral harm caused by other pollutants at
the plant, such as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, mercury, and particle pollution, will
not be addressed by shifting pollution control to a landfill in Texas.
35 See id. ("When offsets are not allowed, incentives to reduce emissions or
sequester carbon are limited to the covered sources, and there is little motivation to
improve mitigation technologies for non-covered sources. Including offsets in a cap-
and-trade program would expand these incentives.").
36 Id.
37 See FORGING A FRONTIER, supra note 3, at 21 ("The United States did not ratify
the Kyoto Protocol, and the federal government does not currently regulate carbon
dioxide . . . or any other GHGs regulated under Kyoto as climate change-related
pollutants.").
38 Id. at 17.
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system through which members make legally binding
commitments to reduce their emissions under an emissions cap.
39
The exchange currently boasts about 350 members, ranging from
businesses such as Dupont and Motorola, to the cities of Oakland
and Chicago, and to universities such as the University of
California and the University of Minnesota, and organizations like
the National Farmers Union and AMTRAK.40 CCX participants
may trade offsets registered for sale on CCX and verified by
approved third party firms specializing in particular fields.41
The over-the-counter retail market consists of a wide range of
voluntary transactions not driven by any sort of emissions cap. 2
As described above, participants include individuals and
organizations interested in offsetting their GHG emissions, as well
as those preparing for upcoming regulation and looking for pre-
compliance opportunities.43 In 2007, individual consumers made
up only 5% of the market, with private, public interest, and
government entities accounting for the rest.44  Interestingly,
foreign entities made up the largest share of the market, even
though offsets originating in the United States do not satisfy any
reduction requirements under international treaties such as the
Kyoto Protocol.45  Offsets generated in the United States also
39 Id.
40 Members of the CCX, http://www.chicagoclimateexchange.com (follow
"Member List" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
41 See Offset Project Verification, http://wwwchicagoclimateexchange.com/
content.jsf?id=102 (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) (listing nine approved verification
categories and over ninety approved verifiers). CCX offset projects undergo an initial
verification process, as well as annual verification during their enrollment in CCX. Id.
The verification reports are initially prepared by approved verifiers, and are later
reviewed by CCX staff and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). ld.
42 FORGING A FRONTIER, supra note 3, at 18.
43 Id.
44 See id. at 66 (noting individuals and NGOs purchased 5% and 13% of credits
transacted in 2007, respectively); THE WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE CARBON
MARKET 2008 23 (2008) [hereinafter WORLD BANK REPORT] (noting private companies
accounted for 79% of the volume of credits transacted in 2007).
45 See FORGING A FRONTIER, supra note 3, at 67 (noting that the greatest share of
purchasers of carbon offsets from a single region hailed from the European Union). See
generally Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change arts. 3, 6, 12, 17, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, 24-27 (entered into force Feb. 15,
2005) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (establishing 1990 as the baseline year for the Parties
to use in developing their GHG-reduction targets and describing the mechanisms to give
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cannot be sold in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
(ETS), the Kyoto Protocol compliance market that is currently the
largest carbon market trading platform in the world.46
While 71% of the credits sold in 2006 were purchased by
buyers in North America, this number dropped to 34% in 2007.7
European voluntary buyers, however, accounted for 47% of the
volume of credits bought in 2007, which represents a marked
48increase of 19% from 2006. Buyers in Australia and New
Zealand similarly increased their participation over the same
period, jumping from 1% to 8%. 4 9  Whether fueled by altruism,
the desire to appear altruistic, or other motivations, the voluntary
market has grown exponentially in satisfaction of an increasing
demand for action on climate change. °
Where are these offset projects located? According to latest
reports, an estimated 23% of the 2007 global market volume in
offsets came from U.S. providers. 5 1  The U.S. market has
increased by 66% in the last three years to 10.2 million tons in
2007.52 In 2007, at least 211 projects produced offsets in the U.S.,
which represents an increase of 125% since 2004. 53 Ninety-three
the Parties flexibility in attaining their respective targets); Eric Schaffner, Comment,
Repudiation and Regret: Is the United States Sitting Out The Kyoto Protocol to Its
Economic Detriment?, 37 ENVTL. L. 441, 448 (2007) (discussing that emissions trading,
the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation are mechanisms included
within the Kyoto Protocol that are largely based on the efforts of the U.S. delegation in
Kyoto and are designed to give Parties to the Protocol flexibility in meeting their
emissions reduction goals).
46 See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 15 (describing the European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme); WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 44, at 7 ("The EU
Emission Trading Scheme... continued to dominate the global carbon market in 2007,
both in transaction volume and monetary value.").
47 FORGING A FRONTIER, supra note 3, at 9.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 5.
51 Id. at 43; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 13 (acknowledging that
twenty-three percent of the volume of offsets sold in 2007 may have come from U.S.
providers, but noting it is difficult to separate out the U.S. portion of the global market
because U.S. market participants engage in private transactions across domestic and
international boundaries).
52 GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 13.
53 Id. European voluntary buyers accounted twenty-eight percent of purchases in
2006. Id.
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of those 211 projects were methane projects. 54
A. Offsets as Part of Coming Cap-and-Trade Regulation
Even given our current healthy skepticism of the almighty
marketplace, market-watchers and policymakers anticipate some
form of cap-and-trade system of GHG emissions coming online in
the United States within the next few years.55 If a domestic cap-
and-trade system is adopted, the carbon offset market is projected
to grow exponentially because regulated entities will likely be
allowed to meet a significant portion of their targeted reductions
through offsets. 56  Most legislative versions of cap-and-trade
programs introduced in the last few years incorporate offsets as a
part of emissions reduction goals.57 For example, the Lieberman-
Warner Climate Security Act of 2008 allowed up to 15% of
emissions reductions to be met through investment in offsets, and
a recent draft cap-and trade bill unveiled in the House of
Representatives would allow offsets to account for 20% up to 70%
of emissions reducations, depending on the total annual cap.58
54 Id. at 16.
55 See FORGING A FRONTIER, supra note 3, at 21 (noting legislation addressing
climate change is quickly evolving at the national and multi-state level as more states
become involved and members of Congress announce new legislative proposals).
56 Id. at 30.
57 See id. at 26-30 (describing the quantity of offsets allowed under various
legislative proposals in the 110th Congress).
58 Id. at 26. See also S. 3036, 110th Cong. §§ 2402(a), 2501 (describing the
domestic offset program and use of international emissions allowances). S.3036 was
debated in the Senate in June 2008, but the bill was ultimately defeated when the
sponsors failed to secure enough votes to limit debate and move the bill toward a final
Senate vote. See 154 CONG. REC. S5333-05, S5333-34 (daily ed. June 6, 2008) (vote on
cloture motion). At the close of the 110th Congress, the House Select Committee on
Energy Independence and Global Warming issued a final staff report that included
recommendations for the lllth Congress. See H.R. REP. No. 110-915, at 11 (2008)
(discussing recommendations). The first recommendation called for the enactment of
economy-wide cap-and-trade legislation that would include, among other provisions,
rigorous standards governing the award of offset credits, robust financial incentives for
supplemental reductions in "uncapped" emissions, and the establishment of a rigorous
framework for oversight of the carbon markets. Id. At the time this article is going to
print, the White House has endorsed a draft climate and energy bill unveiled by the
House Energy and Commerce Chairman Henry Waxman of California and
Representative Ed Markey of Massachusetts. See the American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009 (discussion draft), 1 1th Congress, March 31, 2009, available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Pressl 11/20090331 /acesa discussiondraft.pdf. The
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A great deal of energy is being expended by various groups
exploring how offsets will fit into the new regulatory scheme and
how to integrate offsets into the international market.59 The
uniformity and transparency afforded by a standardized
certification program will help U.S. offsets gain access to
international carbon markets that require certification. 60  Offsets
Waxman-Markey legislation would establish a cap-and-trade program allowing offsets to
be used to meet from 20% to up to 70% of the green house gas reductions, depending on
the total annual cap. Id. This flexibility appears to acknowledge that as the cap on
emissions is lowered, covered sources may have to rely increasingly on offsets to meet
reduction targets. See Victor Flatt, Center for Progressive Reform Blog, Waxman-
Markey: Carbon Offsets, available at
http://www.progressiveregulation.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=64B9CE 12-1 EOB-
E803-CAAC5B9AF 14D5223 (April 2, 2009).
59 See Memorandum from Victor B. Flatt on Environment, Energy & Natural
Resources Center, Project to Examine Barriers and Solutions to Integrating E.U. and
U.S. Carbon Markets, Particularly Issues Concerning Offset Definition (Nov. 2008) (on
file with The Center for Environment, Energy & Natural Resources Law at the
University of Houston Law Center), available at http://wwwlaw.uh.edu/EENRCenter/
documents/trading-integration-paper.pdf (noting whether offsets should be allowed both
domestically and internationally is an important question that needs to be answered
before enacting any cap-and-trade bill). See also, Erik B. Bluemel, Unraveling the
Global Warming Regime Complex: Competitive Entropy in the Regulation of the Global
Public Good, 15 U. PA. L. REv. 1981 (2007) (discussing the need for harmonizing the
"global warming regime complex" to maximize compliance with international climate
change measures); Margaret Chon, Marks of Rectitude: Fair Trade, Brand-Based
Regulation and New Global Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming in 2009)
(exploring international standard-setting in the context of trademarks and certification
marks and the potential for furthering the goals of consumer protection and access to
market information).
60 Under the Kyoto Protocol, there are two primary mechanisms designed to
produce offsets or emissions credits. See FORGING A FRONTIER, supra note 3, at 20-21
(describing the Protocol's flexibility mechanisms). The Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) allows developed countries to accrue certified emission reduction (CER) credits
by financing carbon reduction projects in developing countries. Id. at 21. Joint
Implementation (JI) allows emitters in developed countries to purchase emission
reduction units (ERUs) that can be used to meet Kyoto targets from GHG reduction
projects implemented in either another developed country or a country with an economy
in transition. Id. at 20. In both cases, the CER and ERU credits must undergo
independent certification and verification. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 45. In fact, the
European Union has formally advocated linking any future U.S. cap-and-trade market to
the E.U. market by 2015, and has called for uniformity in offsets, specifically
compliance with CDM offset protocol. See Press Release, European Press Room,
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originating in the United States will reach their potential both
domestically and on the international markets when they are
certified under a uniform standard, assuring buyers that the offsets
are credible and fungible.
61
B. The Anatomy of a Carbon Offset
Players in the OTC market include: (1) project developers; (2)
aggregators, wholesalers and retailers of offsets; (3) brokers,
websites and exchanges that facilitate transactions; (4) consumers,
including individuals, businesses, non-profits, governments,
research institutions, universities, religious congregations, utilities
and others; and (5) third party certifiers. 62
Certifiers play a key role in this market as consumers
frequently rely on them to verify the claimed attributes of the
carbon offset. Certifiers will play an increasingly integral role as
we struggle to commoditize offsets to integrate them into domestic
and international markets.
Currently, an array of at least ten offset protocol and
certification programs offer various definitions of what constitutes
a viable offset, each program employing its own certification
standards, which range in degree of complexity.
64
id=58.
61 GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 28. See also Beth Daley, Carbon Confusion:
Buying Emission Offsets is a Challenge for Consumers, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13, 2007,
at Al (noting that lack of a uniform standard for what constitutes a legitimate offset
makes it difficult for consumers to sort out effective offsets from projects that have little
true environmental value). What will become of the voluntary carbon market in a GHG
emissions regulated world, however, is a separate question from whether or not the
voluntary offset market should be subject to a uniform standard. See ECOSYSTEM
MARKETPLACE & BUSINESS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, OFFSETTING EMISSIONS: A
BUSINESS BRIEF ON THE VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKET 2008 18 (2008) (noting a popular
view is that demand for experimental projects and beyond-compliance actions will
persist, so even as regulated schemes expand there will be a place for voluntary markets).
62 FORGING A FRONTIER, supra note 3, at 18-19.
63 See GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 24-25 (noting that one study estimated that
more than 85% of the offsets purchased on the retail market in 2007 were verified by
third parties). Some estimates of the actual percentages of verified offsets, however, fall
below 50%. Id.
64 See id. at 56-58 (describing selected carbon offset standards); FORGING A
FRONTIER, supra note 3, at 58, tbl.4 (describing a number of standards in the voluntary
carbon market), WNF REPORT, supra note 16.
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This proliferation of standards is causing confusion in the
marketplace as there exists no cognizable uniform standard by
which to measure the reliability of offset projects.66 The lack of a
consistent certification standard undermines the integrity of
offsets, both in terms of the current voluntary offset market and
future regulatory markets the United States may join.67 Creating a
uniform certification system will address consumer protection
concerns, and, assuming the standard is reliable and effective, will
also address concerns about the quality of offsets.
68
65 FORGING A FRONTIER, supra note 3, at 57 tbl.2, Future Standards that Suppliers
Plan to Use in 2006. Of the certification programs available, the Voluntary Carbon
Standard (VCS) appears to garner the most interest. Id. The VCS was developed in
2005 by The Climate Group, the International Emissions Trading Association and the
World Economic Forum to provide a robust global standard for voluntary GHG emission
reduction and removal projects and their validation and verification. Voluntary Carb.
Stand., VCS Assoc. (2008) 2007.1 5, available at http://www.v-c-
s.org/docs/Voluntary / 20Carbon / 20Standard%202007_1.pdf. The most recent revision
of the standard, VCS 2007.1, is based primarily on the requirements established by the
International Standards Organization (ISO). Id. See generally id. at 10-23, for a
description of project level requirements and methodologies, as well as the validation
and verification process and requirements.
66 See GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 8 ("Participants in the offset market face
several challenges to ensuring the credibility of offsets, including . . .the existence of
many quality assurance mechanisms for verification and monitoring.").
67 See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 45.
68 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 45. ("The proliferation of standards has caused
confusion in the market, and the existence of multiple quality assurance mechanisms
2009
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Many factors can go into the certification of offsets. There are
certain qualifications that, at a minimum, should be met before
verification. 69 To be legitimate, offsets must be:
(1) Additional: the offset must decrease GHG emissions
below quantities that would have been emitted otherwise in a
business as usual situation. In other words, your contribution
made a difference;
70
(2) Quantifiable: the claimed reductions in GHG can be
measured;
(3) Real: the claimed reductions can be verified;
(4) Permanent: the emissions reduced, sequestered or avoided
by the offset project will not be released into the atmosphere in the
future; and
with different requirements raises questions about the quality of offsets available on the
voluntary market."). The type and efficacy of the standard ultimately promulgated is a
separate issue and beyond the scope of this article; for the purposes of this discussion,
however, I will assume that the uniform standard adopted will be effective in supporting
quality control.
69 MELLON REPORT, supra note 30, at 7. In addition to the five factors enumerated
here, some certification programs also include "co-benefits," which quantify social and
environmental benefits like better habitat preservation and reduction in non-GHG
pollution. See, e.g., The Gold Standard, Annexes to Toolkit 2.0 124-30,
http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/uploads/file/Gold%20Standard-v2Toolkitannexes_2
0080730.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2009) (requiring completion of a sustainable
development matrix that evaluates a number of environmental and social factors, as well
as development of a sustainability monitoring plan as part of application for certification
of Gold Standard offsets).
70 See MELLON REPORT, supra note 30, at 7 (describing the real, additional,
permanent and verifiable qualities of reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases); GAO
REPORT, supra note 15, at 59 (noting that over the past year buyers and sellers have
become increasingly aware of the relevance and role of carbon credit registries that track
credit transactions and ownership, as well as reduce the risk that a single credit can be
sold to more than one buyer). It should be noted that there are a wide variety of methods
for determining additionality, including investment analysis (considers the financial
attractiveness of a proposed project without revenue from offsets), barrier analysis
(considers the organizational, cultural, or social impediments to the implementation of a
proposed project) and common practice analysis (if a project does not reduce emissions
below levels produced by "common practice" technologies that provide the same
products and services as the project, the project should not be pursued, regardless of the
potential for offsets). Id. at 26, tbl.2. See also THE CLIMATE TRUST, DETERMINING THE
ADDITIONALITY OF GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION PROJECTS 5-6 (2008), available at
http://www.climatetrust.org/pdfs/Climate-Trust-Additionality.pdf (listing the tests to
determine a project's additionality as the regulatory surplus test, the barriers test, and the
common practice test).
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(5) Enforceable: offset must be backed by documents
establishing exclusive ownership, ensuring no multiple ownership
or double counting (multiple purchases of the same offset).7'
C. Too Many Certifiers Spoil the Soup
Significant challenges face the carbon offset market. The lack
of a uniform definition of "carbon offset" or an industry consensus
around baseline minimum standards for verifying these offsets in
the United States raises real problems in terms of consumer
confusion and the potential for fraud.72 The term "certified" has
different meanings concerning the reliability of particular offset
project attributes, depending on which certification standard or
protocol is being applied.73 A consumer has no choice in which
protocol is used and is likely unaware of the distinction between
certification protocols, as it is unclear exactly what is being
verified through "certification." Are consumers of carbon offsets
getting what they pay for? Are these offset projects actually
reducing GHG emissions? Limited consumer protection is
provided through existing fraud standards administered by state
Attorney Generals, but there is no actual government oversight of
this market.74
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is currently examining
the potential for fraud in the offset market. The FTC publishes the
"Guides for use of Environmental Marketing Claims" commonly
known as the "Green Guides. 75  The Green Guides outline
general principles for environmental marketing claims and provide
71 The creation of registries tracking ownership of offsets would address this
attribute. Although beyond the scope of this discussion, others have made the case that
registries must be part of any future offset market. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note
15, at 9, 32 (recommending the establishment of a standardized registry for tracking the
creation and ownership of offsets); MELLON REPORT, supra note 30, at 16 ("An effective
system of registries is critical for an intangible good like carbon to ensure against double
counting of emissions reductions and final retirement of credits.").
72 VERMONT OFFICE OF ATTY. GEN., supra note 20; see also Harvey & Fidler, supra
note 19.
73 See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 15, app. VII, 56-57.
74 VERMONT OFFICE OF ATry. GEN, supra note 20, at 1 (citing the consumer
concerns of ten State Attorney Generals regarding varying definitions of a carbon offset
and making recommendation, including that of enforcement improvements).
75 FTC, REPORTER RESOURCES: THE FTC's GREEN GUIDES,
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/reporter/greengds.shtm, (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
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specific guidance for the use of certain terms in advertising and
labeling, such as "recyclable, .. .. compostable," and
"biodegradable." 76 In November 2007, the FTC began conducting
a regulatory review of the Green Guides, and is now considering
whether to amend the Guides to include carbon offsets and
renewable energy credits.77 Significantly, the provisions of the
Guides are voluntary and are not enforceable; they are designed to
help marketers avoid making unfair or deceptive claims that may
run afoul of Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 45.
Initially conceived as a response to the proliferation of green
marketing claims that began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
Green Guides may seem like an appropriate venue for addressing
consumer protection concerns surrounding carbon offsets, as one
of the latest "go green" products to hit the market. 79 However,
given the enforcement limitations of the Green Guides, FTC's
involvement will not supplant the need for a uniform certification
standard. Moreover, the FTC's mission with regard to
environmental matters is limited to trade and consumer protection
concerns; FTC's review of the Green Guides does not address the
complex environmental policy issues underlying specific offset
performance standards. Because carbon offsets cover a diverse
range of potential projects, the success of which depends on a
number of complex attributes that have not been uniformly
defined, relying on the Green Guides to sort out consumer
confusion and market integrity concerns seems premature at best
and ineffective as the sole source of government oversight of this
76 16 C.F.R. § 260 (2008).
77 See FTC Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims; Carbon
Offsets and Renewable Energy Certificates; Public Workshop [hereinafter FTC Guides],
72 Fed. Reg. 66094; 66097 (Nov. 27, 2007) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 260), available at
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2007/pdf/E7-23006.pdf.
78 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2008). Specifically, the Guides "provide the basis for voluntary
compliance with such laws by members of industry. Conduct inconsistent with the
positions articulated in these guides may result in corrective action by the Commission
under Section 5 if, after investigation, the Commission has reason to believe that the
behavior falls within the scope of conduct declared unlawful by the statute." 16 C.F.R. §
260.1 (2008).
79 16 C.F.R. § 260 (2008). FTC issued the Green Guides in 1992, and updated
them in 1996 and 1998.
80 See FTC Guides, supra note 77.
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market. Thus, any action by the FTC would be supplemental, and
would not obviate the need for government oversight in the
context of a uniform certification standard of carbon offsets.
Lack of standardization in the U.S. offset market makes it
difficult for consumers to determine if offsets are fungible
(interchangeable and of comparable quality). The market reveals
considerable price variance between offsets, ranging from $4.2 per
ton of carbon to $20 per ton of carbon, raising concerns that
offsets are not a uniform commodity that can be efficiently traded
on domestic and international markets.81
o o8
Sourme Ecosystem Marketplee, New Garban Finace. Note. Number witin prentheses inrdicates
number of date points.
A uniform standard of certification would help provide price
stability while addressing consumer confidence issues and shoring
up the integrity of the offset market.
I. Lessons Learned from the Evolution of the Organic
Products Market; From a Fragmented, Multi-Standard
Approach to a Uniform Standard of Certification
The history underlying the organic agriculture certification
model is instructive in the present case. The Organic Food
Production Act of 1990 (OFPA) was promulgated to address the
proliferation of organics claims in the 1970s through the 1980s
which had created a confusing patchwork of conflicting state and
private marketing standards. 82  Oregon passed the first organic
81 See FORGING A FRONTIER, supra note 3.
82 See Donald Homstein, The Road Also Less Taken: Lessons from Organic
Agriculture For Market- and Risk-Based Regulation, 56 DuKE L.J. 1541, 1550 (2006).
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food law in 1973, and by 1990, twenty-two States had passed
some kind of organics regulation. 83  These regulations varied
significantly in terms of the definition of "organic" - for example,
a loaf of bread labeled "organic" might contain 20% organic
ingredients, 100%, or zero organic ingredients. 84 Certification was
required in some states, and not in others. 85 Moreover, twenty-
86eight states had no organics regulations at all. Thus, consumers
of organics were faced with a confusing array of "organic"
products with no way to verify their authenticity.
Emboldened by the lack of uniform certification, false and
misleading organics claims multiplied.87 These conflicting and
sometimes misleading claims undermined consumer confidence in
organic products and, as a result, both consumers and retailers of
organic products became reluctant to purchase those products. 88
It became inefficient and unmanageable to address consumer
confusion and consumer fraud concerning organic products on a
case-by-case basis. Faced with this consumer confusion,
particularly in the climate of growing consumer interest in
organics both domestically and abroad, the organics industry
petitioned Congress to create a federal uniform standard.89
83 OR. REv. STAT. § 616.406 (1996) (originally codified at § 632.95 (1973),
repealed 2002). See Kate L. Harrison, Organic Plus: Regulating Beyond the Current
Organic Standards, 25 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 211, 215 (2008); Kenneth C. Amatidz, The
Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 and Its Impending Regulations: A Big Zero for
Organic Food?, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 537, 539 (1997); Kyle W. Lathrop, Preempting
Apples with Oranges: Federal Regulation of Organic Food Labeling, 16 J. CORP. L. 885,
891 (1991).
84 See Gordon G. Bones, State and Federal Organic Food Certification Laws:
Coming of Age?, 68 N.D. L. REv. 405, 425 (1992); (citing S. Rep. No. 357, 101st Cong.,
289, 290-92 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4944).
85 See Harrison, supra note 83, at 215; Bones, supra note 84, at 408; Amaditz,
supra note 83, at 539.
86 See Harrison, supra note 83, at 215; Bones, supra note 84, at 406; Amaditz,
supra note 83, at 539.
87 See Bones, supra note 84, at 406; Amaditz, supra note 83, at 539; see also
Harrison, supra note 83, at 215.
88 S. REP. No. 357, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4944; Amaditz, supra note 83,
at 539.
89 Amaditz, supra note 83, at 539; see also JEAN M. RAWSON, ORGANIC
AGRICULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES, PROGRAM & POLICY ISSUES 3-4 (Cong. Res. Serv.,
updated Aug. 22, 2008) ("The industry maintained that federal standards would reduce
consumer confusion over the many different state and private standards in use, and
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OFPA became law in 1990.90 The OFPA is essentially a
marketing-oriented statute that sets uniform minimum standards
for producers and processors of organic products. 9' When a
product is labeled "Certified Organic" in the United States today,
it means that the product has successfully met a detailed series of
regulations mandating how that product is grown, harvested,
raised, and prepared. 9 The OFPA thus provides a process-based
definition of organic (e.g. examining whether pesticides are used
in managing crop pests) rather than a product-based definition that
would rely on quantified characteristics of the product itself, such
as whether the product contains pesticides or other chemical
residues.
93
would promote confidence in the integrity of organic products over the long term.").
90 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (2004).
91 States may seek approval to establish their own State Organic Program and may
adopt "more restrictive requirements because of environmental conditions or the
necessity of specific production or handling practices particular to the State or the region
of the United States." 7 C.F.R. § 205.620 (2008). To date, California and Utah are the
only states that have their own organics programs, although Utah recently announced
plans to discontinue its program. See Dawn House, State Eliminates Organic
Certification Program, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 28, 2009. California's program can be
accessed at: http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/is/i & c/organic.html.
92 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.300 (2008), 205.400 (2008). The U.S.D.A. National Organic
Program (NOP) recognizes the following labeling options: (a) "100 percent organic" -
must contain (by weight or fluid volume, excluding water and salt) 100 percent
organically produced ingredients (7 C.F.R. §205.301(a) (2008)); (b) "Organic"- must
contain (by weight or fluid volume, excluding water and salt) not less than 95 percent
organically produced raw or processed agricultural products (7 C.F.R. §205.301(b)); (c)
"Made with organic" - Must contain (by weight or fluid volume, excluding water and
salt) at least 70 percent organically produced ingredients (7 C.F.R. §205.301(c)); (d)
"Products with less than 70 percent organically produced ingredients" - Contains less
than 70 percent organically produced ingredients (7 C.F.R. §205.301(d)); (e) Packaged
products labeled "100 percent organic" or "organic" on the information panel, must
identify the name of the certifying agent that certified the handler of the finished product
and may display the business address, Internet address, or telephone number of the
certifying agent in such label (7 C.F.R. §205.303(a)); (f) Packaged products labeled "100
percent organic" or "organic" must also identify each organic ingredient in the ingredient
statement with the word "organic" or with an asterisk or other reference mark which is
defined below the ingredient statement to indicate the ingredient is organically produced
(7 C.F.R. §205.303(b)). In all cases, water or salt included as ingredients cannot be
identified as organic. Id.
93 See id.; see also Michelle T. Freidland, You Call that Organic? The USDA's
Misleading Food Regulations, 13 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 379, 384 (2005) (critiquing the
NOP as being a "process" based, rather than "product" based organic certification
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The stated purpose of the OFPA is to "(1) establish national
standards governing the marketing of certain agricultural products
as organically produced products; (2) assure consumers that
organically produced products meet a consistent standard; and (3)
facilitate interstate commerce in fresh and processed food that is
organically produced., 94  Thus, the statute was specifically
designed to address consumer confusion over the myriad state and
private organics standards in use and to promote confidence in the
integrity of the organic products market in the long term.95 Market
stakeholders recognized that creating a consistent U.S. organic
standard would facilitate access to international organic markets. 96
system).
94 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (2004), "Purposes."
95 RAWSON, supra note 89, at Summary. ("The purpose of the program, which was
implemented in October 2002, is to give consumers confidence in the legitimacy of
products sold as organic, permit legal action against those who use the term fraudulently,
increase the supply and variety of available organic products, and facilitate international
trade in organic products."). Consumer confidence in the integrity of organic products
was recently shaken when it was discovered that the Organic Crop Improvement
Association certified as organic peanuts that were contaminated with salmonella. As a
result of this contamination, nine people have died and hundreds of people have
become ill. Kim Severson & Andre Martin, It's Organic, but Does that Mean it's
Safer? N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 4, 2009, Dl. This horrific situation reveals the limitations of
organic certification, which ironically certifies that a particular food product was
produced without the aid of pesticides, but not that the food is safe to consume. Id As
discussed further in Part IV, the peanut case also underscores the potential conflict of
interest in the third party certification structure, and the need for meaningful government
oversight of any such third party certification program.
96 RAWSON, supra note 89, at 4 ("Industry analysts asserted that a consistent U.S.
organic standard would facilitate access to a potentially lucrative international organic
market."). In fact, both domestic and international organic markets have been quite
lucrative. Id. at 1 ("The annual rate of market growth for organic foods and other
products has remained around the 20% rate it achieved beginning in 1990, although
analysts generally expect it to moderate over the next decade."). Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T
OF AGRICULTURE, ECONOMIC RES. SERV., REPORT No. A1B777, RECENT GROWTH
PATTERNS IN THE U.S. ORGANIC FOODS MARKET (Sept. 2002)). According to the Organic
Trade Association 2007 Manufacturer's Survey, domestic sales of organic food products
were $16.7 million in 2006 (about 2.8% of total U.S. retail food sales). Id. Limited
figures are available for US export of organic foods, but were estimated between $125-
300 million in 2000-2002. Id. at 2. Interestingly, the fastest growing area appears to be
sales of nonfood organic products (supplements, personal care products, flowers, pet
foods and fibers), which accounted for $938 million in sales in 2006. RAWSON, supra
note 89, at 2.
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The history of consumer confusion over the unregulated
organics market and the need for a uniform standard defining
organic products shares striking similarities with the current state
of the carbon offset market.97 Consumers cannot independently
verify whether a particular product is organic. Nor can consumers
independently verify whether a carbon offset lives up to its GHG
reduction promise. While we can decide if Coke really does taste
better than Pepsi, we can't independently verify whether or not a
breakfast cereal is organic or if a methane burning project at a
landfill in Texas is additional and quantifiable. Consumers rely on
certification to vouch for the claimed attributes of these products.
98
As discussed herein, the same problems of consumer
confusion and questions of product integrity that undermined the
organics market now plague the offset market.99 Narrowing the
97 The concerns expressed in the Senate report underlying OFPA track similar
problems facing the carbon offset market today: "Growth in the organic food trade
however has been hampered by a lack of consistent standards for production. The
Committee believes that it is time for national standards for organic production so that
farmers know the rules, so that consumers are sure to get what they pay for, and so that
national and international trade in organic foods may prosper." S. REP. No. 357,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 4943.
98 "[Tlhe essence of [certification] is that consumers can believe it, because it is not
an unsubstantiated boast by the company itself but the result of an examination, against
internationally accepted standards of best practice, by trained and experienced auditors
who don't hesitate to say no or to impose conditions." JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: How
SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED, 474 (Penguin Books 2006) (as quoted by
Dodge, supra note 14).
99 See Michael Gillenwater, Derik Broekhoff, Mark Trexler, Jasmine Hyman, &
Rob Fowler, Policing the Voluntary Carbon Market, 6 NATURE REP., CLIMATE CHANGE
85, 86 (2007) (describing the challenges facing GHG offsets as including "monitoring
and verification to assure that offsets are being achieved in the manner and quantity
promised." Gillenwater goes on to state:
Generally, independent third-party verification of offset projects against a
common standard is necessary for consumers to have a reliable and unbiased
source of information on offset quality. Analogously, we do not expect
consumers of organic food to monitor the farming practices of their food
suppliers. Yet, for voluntary carbon offsets, there is no agreed standard for
monitoring methods or the appropriate frequency and requirements for
verification.
Id. See also GAO REPORT, supra note 15. Arguably, the need for reliable,
uniform standards is even more acute in the context of carbon offsets than in the
Organics market. In the offset market, one is certifying the absence of something -
GHG emissions, rather than the attributes of a product in hand. The consumer has no
organic apple to examine or cup of hot "fair trade" coffee to taste at the end of an offset
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field from ten diverse certification protocols to one uniform
standard verifying a set group of offset project attributes would be
one way to address these issues.100 Moreover, as in the organics
market, the creation of a single, uniform standard is likely to be a
necessary step to integrating the U.S. offset market into any future
U.S. cap-and-trade regime. 1  Finally, a uniform standard may
also prove to be essential to facilitating access of U.S. offset to
international markets.1
0 2
Ill.The Role of Market Stakeholders in Creating and
Administering a Uniform Certification Standard for
Carbon Offsets
Working from the proposition that a single certification
standard is desirable, the issue becomes how to develop that
standard and how to administer it. Potential regulatory approaches
range from interventionist command and control approaches with
predictable standards and policed enforcement, to economic
incentives and co-regulation, to self-regulation and pure
voluntarism. 10 3  A variety of factors influence which regulatory
transaction. Rather, the consumer pays for the promise that a number of tons of GHG
emissions will be eliminated or avoided based on the claimed attributes of a particular
offset project.
100 Id.
101 See, e.g., S. 2191, 110th Cong. §§ 2402, 2502; see also H.R. REP. No. 110-915,
at 45-56 (2008) (recommending that the 111 th Congress enact cap-and-trade legislation
that includes the use of offsets).
102 As discussed in Part I, the United States is a significant exporter of offsets. The
majority of consumers of U.S. offsets are foreign entities that purchase U.S. offsets
despite the fact that those offsets do not satisfy GHG reduction requirements under
Kyoto. See supra notes 44, 45. Sales of U.S. offsets are likely to increase if they meet
reduction requirements under international law.
103 There exists a vast body of literature discussing the merits and foils of co-
regulation. See, e.g., Kimberly Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 50 ARIz. L. REV. 879
(forthcoming 2009) ("[T]he literature on responsive regulation and its many variations is
vast, nuanced, and spans numerous fields, including law, management and
environmental sciences, political science, and sociology."). See also IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE
(Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (drawing on empirical studies of regulation from other
countries and game theory to advocate "responsive regulation"); Cary Conglianese &
Jennifer Nash, The Promise & Performance of Management-Based Strategies, in
LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING
PRIVATE SECTOR ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 261 (2006) (encouraging co-regulation
though management-based strategies). However, this article only briefly touches on an
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approach will be most efficient in a given industry sector. Those
factors include the type of industry regulated, the size of
enterprises within an industry, and what motivates that industry.
Even the presence of particularly influential actors - such as a Bill
Gates-type CEO - within a particular enterprise can make a
difference.10 4 The make-up of the regulated community can drive
the effectiveness - or failure - of a particular form of regulation.'
0 5
In general, providers of offsets in the U.S. offset market are
smaller enterprises, motivated (at least in part) by environmental
concerns.I°6
A. The Role of Market Participants in Creating a Uniform
Certification Standard
As described herein, certification of carbon offset projects in
the voluntary market is private and voluntary. At the other end of
the spectrum, the traditional command and control regulatory
approach creates a very limited role for market participants in
promulgating rules and standards. Under this model the
government agency develops and implements standards and
procedures, with limited input from the public. For example,
under the CAA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is
charged with creating the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) to determine which pollutants "cause or contribute to
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
area ripe for future discussion in the context of climate change mitigation strategies.
104 See NEIL GUNNINGHAM & DARREN SINCLAIR, LEADERS & LAGGARDS: NEXT
GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 199 (Greenleaf 2002) (noting that "the
complexity of motivational forces influencing environmental behavior" creates a need to
develop corresponding "instruments and strategies" for regulation). See also Krawiec,
supra note 103, at 894 (noting that the effectiveness of co-regulation "is context-
dependent and determined by any number of factors, including.., the characteristics of
individual regulated firms, such as senior management's commitment to improvement").
105 GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 104.
106 See GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 10. For examples of environmental
organizations involved in developing offsets and standards for the voluntary markets,
see, e.g., The Environmental Resources Trust, Inc., http://www.ert.net/aboutertfull.html
#1 (developed by Environmental Defense Fund, providing registry and certification
services), and The Gold Standard, http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org (providing standards
and certification service for carbon offsets, created by environmental and development
non-governmental organizations, including the World Wide Fund for Nature and the
Rainforest Alliance).
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public health or welfare[.]"' 7 EPA is solely responsible for
developing these air quality standards.108  Participation by
stakeholders or any other entity is limited to the public
participation afforded by the notice and comment period. 109 Given
the unique nature of the carbon offset market, strict adherence to a
traditional command and control approach with limited
opportunities for stakeholder input in the creation of a uniform
certification standard for offset projects is not ideal.
Another path to standard certification might be industry
agreement on one particular offset standard or protocol. The fair
trade movement offers an example of a voluntary coalition around
a uniform certification standard. Started on a very small scale by
religious and political organizations seeking to promote improved
labor conditions for growers and producers, the fair trade
movement grew to over a billion dollar industry by 2005.110 A
myriad of fair trade labeling initiatives had emerged across North
America and Europe by the end of the 1990s."'1 Faced with
consumer confusion over the proliferation of "fair trade" claims,
the Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International (FLO)
promoted the development of a single international fair trade label
107 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2006).
108 Id. ("[T]he [EPA's] Administrator shall ... publish, and from time to time
thereafter revise, a list which includes each air pollutant"); see also Daniel H. Cole &
Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology,
and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental
Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REv. 887, 910 (1999) (discussing the origins of the Clean Air
Act, and Congress' broad delegation to the EPA).
109 See 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2006) (outlining rulemaking procedures for the
"promulgation or revision of any national ambient air quality standard," and limiting
such procedures to notice and comment, and publication).
110 While the concept of "fair trade" can be traced back to the nineteenth century,
the modem movement largely developed in the last sixty years. Andy Redfern A. &
Paul Snedker, Creating Market Opportunities for Small Enterprises: Experiences of the
Fair Trade Movement, International Labour Office (2002), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/emp
ent/docs/F1057768373/WP30-2002.pdf. For a brief history of the fair trade movement,
see the International Fair Trade Association, Sixty Years of Fair Trade, at
http://www.wfto.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task-view&id = 10&Itemid= 17
(last visited Mar. 27, 2009); see also Michael K. Goodman, Reading Fair Trade.
Political Ecological Imaginary and the Moral Economy of Fair Trade Foods, 23 POL.
GEO. 891 (2004).
111 See Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International, http://www.fairtrade.net/
aboutus.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2009).
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(the "Fairtrade Certification Mark").' 2  FLO is an umbrella
organization that unites twenty labeling initiatives in twenty-one
countries and producer networks around the globe. In order to use
the fair trade mark on a product, entities in the production chain
must meet the standards created and enforced by FLO, which is
now the leading standard setting and certification organization for
Fair trade labeled products. 113 Certification of fair trade products
is provided by Transfair USA, a member of FLO, and the only
third-party certifier of fair trade products recognized by FLO in
the United States.'
1 14
While the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) is currently the
most frequently utilized certification standard in the voluntary
offset market, market stakeholders have not yet reached consensus
on a particular standard or protocol as is the case in fair trade.
115
Moreover, although FLO has been fairly successful in promoting
the fair trade label, the FLO standard is not the only possible
standard available and concerns remain about the possible dilution
of that label by fair trade competitors." 16 However, FLO remains
an example of how a standardized certification scheme could
develop in the context of carbon offsets.
A third standard-setting option is a regulatory scheme that
incorporates the experience and expertise of market participants in
creating a certification standard. The organic products industry
provides an example of this type of blended regulatory system. In
the Organic Food Product Act, the legislature mandated that the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA, the regulatory agency
responsible for implementing the Act) include direct input from
the organic foods industry through the creation of a National
112 Seeid.
113 FLO requires compliance with Generic and Product Specific Fairtrade standards,
as well as separate fair trade standards for traders. See Fairtrade Labeling Organizations
International Standards, http://www.fairtrade.net/standards.html.
114 See id. See also Fair Trade Certified: Transfair USA,
http://www.transfairusa.org/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2009).
115 See FORGING A FRONTIER, supra note 3, for a discussion of Voluntary Carbon
Markets.
116 See Todd Mumford, Voluntary International Standards; Incorporating "Fair
Trade" Within Multilateral Trade Agreements, 14 S.W. J.L. & TRADE AM. 171, 172
(2007) (looking to Organic Food Labeling as a model for fair trade and raising concerns
about the potential for copy cat fair trade labels).
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Organic Standards Board (NOSB). The purpose of this fifteen-
member board, comprised of nongovernment, industry
representatives, was to "assist in the development of standards for
substances to be used in organic production" and to "provide
recommendations to the [USDA] Secretary regarding
implementation."' 17  The Act specifies that the fifteen-member
board include a cross section of individuals with experience in
organic farming, handling, sales, and certification, as well as
individuals with expertise in environmental protection, toxicology,
and consumer protection."18  While the interplay between the
NOSB and the USDA proved somewhat flawed in practice - the
final organic production standards were not promulgated until
2002, ten years after the Act was passed 19 - the concept of an
advisory board consisting of diverse market participants, whose
role is to assist the regulatory government agency in developing a
uniform certification standard, could prove particularly useful in
the carbon offset context.
Shifting to a single uniform standard governing carbon
offset projects will undoubtedly involve tradeoffs. According to a
recent GAO Report on the offset market, some market participants
have expressed concern that a single certification standard might
reduce flexibility, increase administrative costs and could stifle
117 7 U.S.C. § 9718(a) (2006); 7 U.S.C. § 9718(k) (2006).
118 Specifically, the Act provides as follows:
(b) Composition of Board. The Board shall be composed of 15 members, of
which: (1) four shall be individuals who own or operate an organic farming
operation; (2) two shall be individuals who own or operate an organic handling
operation; (3) one shall be an individual who owns or operates a retail
establishment with significant trade in organics products; (4) three shall be
individuals with expertise in areas of environmental protection and resource
conservation; (5) three shall be individuals who represent public interest or
consumer groups; (6) one shell be an individual with expertise in the fields of
toxicology, ecology or biochemistry; and (7) one shall be an individual who is a
certifying agent [as defined in the Act].
7 U.S.C. § 9718 (b) (2006).
119 The final standards were the end result of years of negotiations between the
USDA and the fifteen-member Board. After several missteps - the most notorious being
the USDA's 1997 inclusion of genetically modified organisms, nuclear irradiation and
municipally treated sewage sludge in the "organics" process - over the strenuous
objections of the NOSB Board - the USDA issued the final version of the NOP
regulations in 2002. See Hornstein, supra note 82, at 1550.
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innovation in the voluntary offset market. 20 On the other hand, a
completely unsupervised drive for innovation may also encourage
offset projects with unforeseen and undesirable environmental
effects. 121  The creation of an advisory board, like the NOSB,
could help to address these concerns by bringing the existing
expertise of project developers, certifiers and other market
stakeholders to the regulatory process. Careful crafting of
standards with direct input from market stakeholders could address
issues such as encouraging innovation and incentivizing non-
covered sectors. As market stakeholders, the advisory board
members would have a direct understanding of potential trade-offs
and a vested interest in creating workable standards. Moreover,
environmental justice concerns, issues regarding leakage
(reductions in one location causing emissions in another place for
example, through relocation), and the role of collateral
environmental benefits and harms could also be considered by
such a board.
122
One might question why this proposed advisory board,
made up of diverse stakeholders, should come to agreement on a
uniform standard when they have not already done so. Certainly
the existence of ten-plus certification standards and protocols
evidences the fact that the market stakeholders have not yet
succeeded in reaching a voluntary agreement on a single standard.
However, a legislative mandate requiring a single standard and
providing an opportunity for market participants to help design
that standard may provide an incentive structure that is lacking in
the current voluntary market.
120 See GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 28 (discussing the concern that a single
standard will not provide the flexibility needed to deal with diverse and innovative
projects).
121 See, e.g., RAMSEUR, supra note 16. For example, ocean fertilization, which
purports to improve carbon sequestration by releasing iron into parts of the ocean to
stimulate phytoplankton growth, is highly controversial. Id. (citing Ken 0. Buesseler, et
al., Ocean Iron Fertilization - Moving Forward in a Sea of Uncertainty, 319 ScI. MAG.
162, 162 (2008)).
122 See GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 3 1, regarding administrative burdens.
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B. The Role of Market Stakeholders in Administering a
Uniform Certification Standard
Under a command and control regulatory approach, the
government agency responsible for developing rules and standards
is also typically responsible for implementing those standards.' 23
While the governing federal agency may delegate authority to
corresponding state agencies,' 24 the public's role in administering
standards is limited to self-reporting requirements.'
2 5
A more inclusive approach is found in the fair trade and
organics markets, which utilize independent, third party certifiers
to certify products. In the case of fair trade, Transfair is the sole
certifier of fair trade products in the United States, while FLO Cert
GmbH, an independent international certification entity, offers fair
trade certification in more than seventy countries. 126 Designating
third party certifiers such as Transfair and FLO Cert gives FLO a
measure of control and oversight in the certification process.
Similarly, in the organics market, the legislature expressly
delegated the administration of certification standards to third
party USDA-accredited certifiers rather funneling the entire
process through the USDA. 127  Under the OFPA, the USDA
accredits state and private certification agents who are charged
with making site visits to producers, processors, and handlers to
certify that their operations meet the OFPA's standards.1
2 8
Certification applicants must have "sufficient expertise in organic
123 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
124 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006) (mandating that each state develop plans to
implement and enforce the EPA's promulgation of NAAQS). The EPA must approve
each state plan. Id.
125 See ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, CAA NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS,
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/civil/caa/caaenfprog.html#stationary (last visited Mar.
27, 2009) ("The Act grants EPA expansive and sweeping authority to: request
information from individuals and companies, inspect facilities, conduct investigations,
and pursue judicial and administrative enforcement actions for injunctive relief and civil
penalties.").
126 See FLO-CERT, http://www.flo-cert.net/flo-cert/main.php (last visited Mar. 27,
2009); Fair Trade Certification Overview, http://www.transfairusa.org/content/
certification/.overview.php (last visited Feb. 7, 2009); see also Mumford, supra note
116.
127 7 U.S.C. § 6503(d) (2006); see Hornstein, supra note 82, at 1550.
128 7 U.S.C. § 6503(d) (2006).
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farming and handling techniques as determined by the
Secretary."' 129  These state and private certifiers conduct annual
reviews to verify continued compliance with the OFPA.
Certification agents are reviewed for re-accreditation every five
years. 130
Involving private enterprise by utilizing accredited third party
certifiers to administer the uniform regulation and certify offset
projects could serve several key functions if done with appropriate
safeguards. First, there are likely to be fewer administrative costs
involved in accrediting certifiers than in administering
certification programs internally through a government agency.
Moreover, using private certifiers rather than an administrative
agency to conduct site visits and review and certify offset projects
would likely be more time efficient. Administrative backlog
would be death to many offset projects, which rely on timely
certification in order to attract funding sources. 131 Having several
possible certifiers available should create competition and place a
premium on timeliness and efficiency. In addition, using local
third party certifiers with project-type expertise could help provide
flexibility in dealing with projects unique to a specific
geographical location. Dealing with a local certifier could provide
project developers with access to someone familiar with particular
local issues, as opposed to appealing to a large federal bureaucracy
in Washington D.C.
132
129 7 U.S.C. §§ 6514-6516 (2006).
130 7 U.S.C. § 6514(c) (2006).
131 The cost of certification under a uniform standard might place additional financial
burdens on offset providers. This burden is addressed in the organics market to some
extent by the Organics Cost Share Program, a certification fund available for organic
producers and handlers seeking certification. 40 C.F.R. § 205.400(e) (2008) (payment of
fee to certifying agent required at application); but see 40 C.F.R. § 205.642 (2008) (fees
charged by a certifying agent must be reasonable, and can charge applicants only those
fees and charges that it has filed with the NOP). The 2008 Farm Bill reauthorizes the
National Organic Certification Cost Share program and provides $22 million to support
it. See National Organic Certification Cost-Share Program, 7 U.S.C.A. § 6523 (2008).
An organic producer or handler can receive up to 75% ($750 maximum) of certification
fees. Id. Creating a similar certification pool of money for offset certification would help
alleviate some of the financial burdens associated with certification, and would be an
improvement over the current system which requires payment of all certification costs by
the party seeking certification.
132 Of course, to some extent, this would perpetuate the tension between uniformity
and the need for flexibility in a market advancing new technologies.
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Finally, certifiers may be in a stronger position than individual
project developers to advocate project specific approaches that
require more flexibility than a centralized administration of
certification might allow. 133 Thus, third-party certifiers could act
as "aggregators" of offset projects, advocating on behalf of a
group of offset project developers to the appropriate government
agency.
34
IV. Avoiding Potential Pitfalls Through Meaningful
Government Oversight
This article does not purport to offer a blue print for the
development and implementation of a particular uniform carbon
offset certification program. A myriad of policy and practical
considerations, too numerous to catalogue and address here, will
govern that process. However, the dangers attending lack of
meaningful government oversight in co-regulatory programs merit
some discussion here.
Meaningful government oversight of private actor partners is
crucial to the success of the blended regulatory carbon offset
certification program proposed herein. Private actors participating
in the regulatory process must be held accountable to the
governing agency. The case for effective government oversight
has been made most recently - and forcefully - by the Securities
and Exchange Commission's (SEC) stunning failure to oversee the
credit rating agencies that helped shape our current financial crisis.
The "big three" credit rating firms, Moody's, Fitch, and Standard
& Poor's, have operated for decades with the SEC's blessing as
133 Stringent oversight of third party certifiers will be essential to ensure that this
flexibility does not undermine offset validity or create an incentive for industry capture
of local third party certifiers.
134 For example, the National Farmer's Union acts as an aggregator of carbon offset
credits in its Carbon Credit Program (CCP), which sells offset credits generated on a
large number of small farm projects on the CCX. The offset credits can be generated
using a large number of techniques, including no-till crop production, methane capture,
conversion of cropland to grass, sustainable management of native rangelands, and tree
plantings on previously non-forested or degraded land. See National Farmer's Union,
Carbon Credit Program, http://nfu.org/issues/enviromnent/carbon-credits (last visited
Mar. 27, 2009); Chicago Climate Exchange, Inc., Members of CCX,
http://www.chicagoclimateexchange.com/content.jsfid=64 (last visited Mar. 27, 2009)
(listing members, including aggregators). See also GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 3-4
(describing the role of aggregators in the carbon offset supply chain).
Vol. XXXIV
THE NEWEST HYBRID
private, third party credit raters of their client's financial
products. 135 Other than being officially recognized as "Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations" (NRSROs), the SEC
provided no meaningful oversight of these powerful rating
organizations. It was not until 2006 that the SEC promulgated
regulations actually defining the requirements for certifying a
credit rater.136 Until that point the SEC had no authority to inspect
or punish existing NRSROs. 1
37
What distinguishes the third party credit raters from the
proposed third party certifiers described herein is the absence of a
uniform standard in the rating industry. Each NRSRO employs
their own distinct brand of credit rating - which has never been
revealed to the public - and is not subject to regulation by the
SEC. 138  The newest rules proposed by the SEC do not even
require each certifier to reveal their credit rating system, much less
require that each independent certifier use the same, uniform
standard. 139 Thus, the promulgation of a uniform certification in
and of itself will help alleviate some of the more egregious
135 But see Peter Galuszka, SEC Slaps Hands of Moody's, S&P, & Fitch, but
Sidesteps Real Change, BNET Fin. Serv., Dec. 4, 2008,
http://industry.bnet.com/financial-services/1000218/avoiding-serious-changes-the-sec-
slaps-credit-raters-hands/ (discussing possible changes to the SEC's regulations, but
acknowledging that any changes are weak).
136 See SEC Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.17g-1-6 (2006) (detailing requirements for NRSROs such as reporting
instructions and prohibited activities). The big three credit rating firms were
"grandfathered in" as NRSROs in 1975. See Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating
Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis 11 (N.Y.U. Ctr. for L. & Bus., Working
Research Paper No. 01-001, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=267083. The big three were
"grandfathered in" as NRSROs in 1975. Id.
137 See Stephen Labaton, Debt-Rating Agencies are Under Scrutiny by S.E.C., N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007, at C4 ("Congress adopted a law ... that gave the S.E.C. new
authority to inspect and punish the agencies."). The "new law" here refers to the Credit
Agency Reform Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C.A. § 780-7 (2006), which is the basis for the
SEC's rules pertaining to NRSROs.
138 See Reem Heakal, What is a Corporate Credit Rating?,
http://ww.investopedia.com/articles/03/102203.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2009) (noting
that each firm applies different rating systems); Labaton, supra note 137 (reporting that
Credit Agency Reform Act of 2006 prevents the SEC "from regulating the procedures
and methods the agencies use to determine ratings").
139 Labaton, supra note 137.
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opportunities for consumer fraud and double-dealing in the offset
market.
Even when certifiers are required to utilize a uniform standard
in evaluating a particular process or product, problems arise when
the government agency administering the third-party accreditation
program lacks the funding necessary to provide meaningful
oversight to third party certifiers. In other words, limited funding
leads to limited oversight of certifiers. The National Organic
Program has suffered from insufficient funding for the
administration of its certification program. The recent outbreak of
salmonella from peanuts that were certified as organic under NOP
standards both reveals the limitations of the NOP program (which
makes no claim as to the safety of certified organic food), and also
provides a stark example of the dangers of lack of proper oversight
of third party certification. While the third party certifiers found
the peanuts in question to have met the organic production
standards under the NOP, they apparently ignored evidence of
health violations, such as rodent droppings and pest infestations, at
the plant. 14  The resulting salmonella outbreak was responsible
for the death of nine people, the illness of almost 700 people and
the recall of nearly 3000 products. 141 The tainted peanuts came
from the Georgia and Texas plants owned by the Peanut
Corporation of America. 142 The Georgia plant was inspected by a
private certifier, the Organic Crop Improvement Association,
while the Texas plant was inspected for organic certification by
the Texas Department of Agriculture. 143 Shockingly, the Texas
Department of Agriculture certified as organic peanuts from the
Texas plant even though that plant had no current state health
department license. 144 As a result of these oversights, the USDA
has issued a notice to all third party certifiers, stating "[e]ffective
immediately, certifying agents are obliged to report violations of








health or safety to the appropriate local, State, or Federal
officials.' 45
Aside from the inherent limits of (NOP), the actions of these
certifiers fell rather short of public expectations. It is unclear
whether the certifiers - both the private company and the Texas
state agency - are under investigation by the USDA or whether
their accreditation under the NOP is vulnerable. To date, the
Compliance and Enforcement Section of the NOP has suspended
the accreditation of two certifying agents, the American Food
Safety Institute International and the California Crop Improvement
Association. 146 Twenty other certifiers are listed by the NOP as
"inactive" and revocation proceedings may be pending for these
organizations.147  This policing problem may be ameliorated by
the increased financial support for NOP administrative costs
allocated in the 2008 Farm Bill, which raises the annual
authorization level for the NOP from $2 million to $6.5 million in
2009, and to $11 million in 2012.148 Similarly, adequate funding
for agency administration and oversight of an offset certification
program will be integral to the success of that program.
A related risk in third party certification programs arises from
the inherent conflict of interest presented by the typical fee
145 Letter from Barbara C. Robinson, Acting Director NOP to All USDA Certifying
Agents, Re: Reporting Health and Safety Violations (Feb. 25, 2009) (on file with the
author).
146 Agricultural Marketing Service, National Organics Program,
http://www.ams.usda.gov/nop/ (follow "Certifiers" hyperlink on right-hand table, then
"Compliance and Enforcement," then "Suspensions and Revocations") (last visited Mar.
27, 2009) [hereinafter NOP website]. Of course, the NOP's failure to adequately police
its accredited third party certifiers may arise as much from a lack of will as a lack of
funding. Critics of the NOP question the choice of the USDA to oversee the standards
for organic farming because the agency is a facilitator of - some claim captive of -
conventional agriculture. See, e.g., Dion Casey, Agency Capture: The USDA 's Struggle
to Pass Food Safety Regulations, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 142, 142 (1998). See also
Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV.
1039 (1997) (discussing agency capture), and Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz,
Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1260, 1282-1304
(2006) (describing various theories of bureaucratic behavior).
147 NOP website, supra note 146 (follow "NOP Reading Room" hyperlink, then
select "Accreditation Audit Reports" topic from the pulldown tab, then select "inactive"
link at the bottom of the page) (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
148 RAWSON, supra note 89, at 9.
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structure of third party certification programs. 149 Specifically, the
fact that the party seeking certification pays for the certification
analysis arguably creates an incentive to approve rather than deny
certification. The public health risk created by the "certified
organic" but salmonella-tainted peanuts stems at least in part from
this inherent conflict. An alternative model of third party
certification designed to reduce this conflict might require those
seeking certification to pay into a fund administered by either the
government or a third party, who would then be responsible for
assigning a certifier to a particular project and paying that certifier
from the fund. Such a system would generate additional
administrative costs but could help alleviate the incentive to
certify and the conflicts generated by the direct monetary
relationship between the producer and the certifier.
Moreover, absent limitations on the role private certifiers
play in other aspects of the market, additional conflicts of interest
arise. For example, the credit rating industry has been heavily
criticized for exploiting its certification role in order to gain
monetary advantage. In addition to giving credit ratings to
investment banks, some credit rating agencies were also advising
these same banks on how to package securities in a way that
would secure a favorable credit rating. 150  This opportunity for
double dealing may be alleviated by the type of restrictions set for
accredited certifier in the OFPA. Specifically, the OFPA
mandates that certifying agents shall not
(1) carry out any inspections of any operation in
which said certifying agent, or employee of such
certifying agent has, or has had, a commercial
interest, including the provision of consultancy
149 7 C.F.R § 205.300; 7 C.F.R § 205.400.
150 See Arthur Levitt, Jr., Former Chairman, U.S. Securities & Exchange
Commission, Remarks to Dialogue with the OSC 2007 (Nov. 27, 2007) (transcript
available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Media/Speeches/2007/sp.20071127_sec-dwo-
levitta.pdf) (commenting that "providing objective ratings and satisfying their corporate
clients may be distorting the rating agencies' judgment."). See Associated Press, SEC
Hopes Rules for Credit-raters Cut Conflicts of Interest, USA TODAY, Dec. 5. 2008
(reporting that new SEC rules specifically prohibit this type of behavior). Conflicts of
interest within the credit rating industry led Senator Robert Menendez to comment that




services; (2) accept payment, gifts, or favors of any
kind from the business inspected other than the
prescribed fees; or (3) provide advice concerning
organic practices or techniques for a fee, other than
fees established under such a program.
15
'
This type of limitation would likewise be important in
limiting the potential for conflicts of interest of third party
certifiers in the carbon offset market.
V. Conclusion
The time has come for some government oversight of the
carbon offset market. 152  Fashioning the appropriate type of
government regulation and oversight for the offset market will be
challenging, given the unique nature of the activity being
regulated. If, in fact, a uniform system of certification is the best
approach to regulating this market, creating a certification system
that includes market stakeholders in the standards forming and
implementing process offers a balance between market integrity
and consumer protection on the one hand, and flexibility and
innovation in the voluntary offset market on the other. Promoting
market integrity and consumer confidence through an efficient
certification process would help the offset market grow and
achieve its full potential to help mitigate climate change.
151 7 U.S.C. § 6515 (h) (2006) (Conflict of Interest).
152 GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 37.
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